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Abstract
Individual retirement savings accounts are replacing or supplementing public basic
pensions. However at decumulation, replacing the public pension with an equivalent
private sector income stream may be costly. We value the Australian basic pension
by calculating the wealth needed to generate an equivalent payment stream using
commercial annuities or phased withdrawals, but still accounting for investment and
longevity risks. At age 65, a retiree needs an accumulation of about 8.5 years￿earn-
ings to match the public pension in real value and insurance features. Increasing
management fees by 1% raises required wealth by about one year￿ s earnings. Delay-
ing retirement by 5 years lowers required wealth by about one half year￿ s earnings.
Phased withdrawals have money￿ s worth ratios close to 0.5 suggesting that private
replacement costs are high.
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Governments across the world are reviewing retirement saving systems in the
light of increasing public pension liabilities. In particular, the role of basic
redistributive pensions that comprise the ￿ ￿rst pillar￿of retirement savings
systems is being reassessed. Basic pensions are designed to ensure that the
elderly reach a minimum level of welfare, and are typically payments of be-
tween 20% and 40% of average earnings, targeted towards the more needy
via income and assets testing (Whitehouse 2007). In countries with high rates
of population aging, ￿rst pillar pensions are consuming an increasing part of
public funds, thus motivating changes to pension indexation systems, eligibil-
ity ages and means-tests. In addition, governments are creating incentives for
individuals to fund their own retirements through personal earnings-related
(second pillar) savings schemes. Policy aims to encourage personal saving,
reduce dependence on ￿rst pillar provisions and relieve the strain on public
funds.
However one implication of replacing public pensions with individual accounts
is that personal savers need to decumulate using commercially-provided in-
come streams such as phased withdrawals and/or annuities. Consequently,
they may face higher costs and greater risks than under the public pension,
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2depending on the prices and insurance features of products o⁄ered by the
￿nancial services sector. If higher accumulations into individual accounts in-
teract with means tests so as to disqualify the elderly from access to the public
basic pension, and commercial provision is expensive or inadequately insured,
the result may be signi￿cant welfare loss. On the other hand, if commercial
products o⁄er more ￿ exibility or better services at a reasonable cost, retirees
may be better o⁄ than when receiving the government payment.
Here we estimate the wealth that a self-funded retiree needs in order to gen-
erate an income stream equivalent to the Australian basic pension in terms of
value and insurance protection, but using decumulation products now o⁄ered
by the ￿nancial services sector. Applying a new analytical approximation to
the retirement income problem (Huang et al. 2004, Milevsky and Robinson
2005), we calculate the purchase price and money￿ s worth 1 of income streams
from private providers that mimic the basic pension.
This analysis serves three purposes. First, we value the basic pension stream
in terms of its replacement cost; secondly we gauge whether an average person
could feasibly accumulate enough wealth over their working lives to replicate
the basic pension payment, and thirdly we measure the di⁄erence between the
cost of public and private provision at the margin, using the money￿ s worth
metric.
Earlier studies of phased withdrawal in retirement (Huang et al. 2004, Milevsky
and Robinson 2000) show that for an in￿nite horizon and lognormally distrib-
uted investment returns, the stochastic present value of a desired spending
1 The money￿ s worth is the ratio of the expected present value of an annuity stream
to its purchase price.
3plan is reciprocal gamma distributed. Consequently we can evaluate the ex
ante feasibility of a spending and investment plan by comparing the stochas-
tic present value of the plan with retirement wealth. This is the probability of
￿ retirement ruin￿or the likelihood of running out of money before the end of
life.
In the more general case, when time horizons are ￿nite and stochastic, we
approximate the probability of running out of resources before the end of
life by matching the ￿rst two moments of the stochastic present value of the
retirement spending plan with the ￿rst two moments of the reciprocal gamma
distribution. The result is an analytical approximation to the probability of
retirement ruin, for random investment returns and uncertain lifetimes. We
￿x the probability of ruin at an arbitrarily low level to approximate the small
regulatory risk of the public pension, then use this moment-matching method
to back out the minimum retirement accumulation needed to replace a pension
using equivalent private sector income streams.
In addition we compute the money￿ s worth of the best phased withdrawal
strategies by calculating the ratio of the simple annuity value of the public
pension stream to the total retirement wealth needed for self-insurance (the
e⁄ective purchase price of self-annuitization). We ￿nd that pension eligibility
creates a substantial transfer of public wealth to the retiree, but that shifting
responsibility for the pension stream from the public to the private sector
means higher personal costs.
We estimate the retiree needs close to $380,000 at age 65 to ensure the life-
long $14,000 p.a. real income now paid by the Australian basic pension. This
amount of savings is almost seven years of average earnings and more than
4four times the average retirement savings account balance of current 60-65 year
olds. Even if eligibility age is delayed to 70 years, the amount of wealth needed
to fund an equivalent real payment is close to $355,000 or nearly 6.4 years of
average earnings. Signi￿cantly less is needed if the retiree pools longevity risk
by purchasing commercial life annuities, but voluntary annuitization is very
rare among Australian retirees. 2 Recipients of the Australian Age Pension
enjoy an option over price and wage increases: the pension is adjusted with
in￿ ation, but also cannot fall below 25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earn-
ings (MTAWE). When we incorporate an historical rate of wages growth into
the pension path, the accumulation required to match it increases further:
an additional $90,000 or close to 8.5 times average annual earnings in total.
In addition, we show that for each 1% increase in management fees or ad-
ministrative loadings, required wealth rises by around $60,000, or one year￿ s
earnings.
The most e¢ cient pension-matching investment strategy is either a ￿ balanced￿
or ￿ growth￿portfolio with around 50-70% allocated to equities or property
securities. The best portfolio allocation may vary by age, gender and risk
tolerance, but more aggressive and more conservative investments generally
require higher initial wealth to be secure and sustainable. However the money￿ s
worth (ratio of expected discounted value of the payment stream to the wealth
needed for the phased withdrawal) of the best strategies are generally below
2 Data on allocation of Australian retirement savings are sparse, but survey evi-
dence suggests that 12% of retirement savings are used to purchase income stream
products (ABS 2006a), and of that, less that 0.2% go to life annuities (Plan for Life
2006). Studies from other countries also note low levels of volutary annuitization
(e.g. James and Song 2001).
50.5, declines as the retiree ages, and is lower for men than for women.
Overall, if current rates of individual retirement accumulation are any guide,
it is unlikely that many Australian retirees will save su¢ cient wealth to self-
insure a pension-equivalent income stream against longevity and investment
risk, using products now available in the retirement incomes market.
Section 2 of the paper sets out the main features of the basic and targeted
pensions in the US, UK and Australia. We describe the method for calculating
the stochastic present value of a spending plan in Section 3, and Section 4
outlines parameter choices. In Section 5 we compute the wealth required by
men and women of retirement age to construct a secure pension payment, and
the money￿ s worth of various self-annuitization strategies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic pensions
Unlike the US and the UK, Australia does not have a public, earnings-linked
pension system. This feature, along with the fact that the majority of Aus-
tralian retirees rely on both public ￿rst-pillar and private second-pillar pro-
visions for retirement income, creates a natural experiment in the interaction
between targeted government retirement support and mandatory savings into
individual retirement accounts.
In the US, the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) system
provides payments after retirement that are not ￿xed at a ￿ at rate but will
vary with lifetime earnings, subject to a minimum level of participation in the
workforce. The redistributive purpose of the OASDI program is achieved by
o⁄ering proportionately higher old age insurance bene￿ts to workers who have
6long work histories in low-paid jobs or who have short work histories, compared
with bene￿ts to higher earners. Payments under OASDI are not means-tested
and accrue to workers as a legal entitlement. Projections of income and cost
rates for OASDI indicate that the system will experience a substantial short
fall in coming decades (McGill et al. 2005). For those over 65 who fail to
qualify for the OASDI bene￿t, means-tested Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) is available to ensure minimum income. SSI is not based on work history
and is paid out of general revenue at a rate of US $623 per month. Apart
from some exemptions (such as an individual￿ s home and vehicle, and some
minimal income concessions), the SSI payment is strictly means-tested across
assets and income.
By contrast, recent pension reform in the UK has made ￿rst pillar provision
there more universal. The Basic State Pension (BSP) of £87.30 (US $177) per
week is available at retirement to those who have a su¢ cient work history.
In 2005, about 80% of men but only about 30% of women of eligible age
received the full BSP. However recent reforms have reduced the number of
years required for eligibility from 44 to 30, with concessions to carers who
have an incomplete work history. Forecasts from the Department for Work
and Pensions (2006a) indicate that 90% of both men and women are expected
to receive the BSP by 2025. For those who still do not qualify for the BSP, or
whose pension payment is low, a safety net is provided by the means-tested
Pension Credit, which ensures income of £119 (US $241) per week. Projections
show that the cost of providing the BSP will rise by 3.4% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) over 2008 when reforms (including broadening the BSP and
linking payments to earnings rather than prices) combine with the e⁄ects of
population aging.
7Both the US and UK regulators will increase pension eligibility ages to 67 and
68 respectively in coming decades.
First pillar provision in Australia falls between the US and UK systems. In
Australia, a large majority of current retirees relies on the basic pension, the
￿ Age Pension￿ , for income, but the payment is means-tested, not universal
and not dependent on work history. Recent survey data show that nearly
70% of couple households and nearly 80% of single-person households over
the age of 64 depend on the Age Pension (or the war veteran￿ s equivalent)
as their primary source of income (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006b).
As the population ages in the next four decades, targeted ￿rst pillar pension
payments, which now represent nearly 2.5% of GDP are projected to increase
to almost 4.4% of GDP (Commonwealth of Australia 2007).
Elderly Australians will continue to rely on ￿rst-tier provision despite the
introduction in 1992 of mandatory, earnings-related retirement savings under
the Australian Superannuation Guarantee. The Superannuation Guarantee
compels Australian workers to contribute at least 9% of income to privately-
managed and fully-funded personal retirement savings accounts, but 15 years
after inception, accumulations into superannuation accounts are still relatively
modest, currently averaging less than $100,000 3 at retirement (ASFA 2007)
and projected to be less than $150,000 by 2020. 4 As a result, most retirees
will continue to depend on ￿rst-tier income support and the Age Pension will
remain a large and increasing component of ￿scal outlays. Nevertheless, it is
a stated policy aim of the Australian Government to encourage private saving
3 This amount is less than twice annual average earnings.
4 Kelly et al. (2002) projects an average balance of $119709 by 2020 in 1999 dollars,
which we scale up by 20% to get an estimate in 2007 dollars.
8and to reduce demand for the basic pension (Commonwealth of Australia,
2002).
Population aging has placed considerable pressure on unfunded public provi-
sion, and many governments have responded by encouraging saving through
personal retirement accounts. In the US, 401(k) coverage is now a substantial
component of retirement provision, with 401(k) contributions the most rapidly
growing component of private sector pension contributions since 1980. Assets
in 401(k) plans are likely to increase greatly in the next 30 years (Poterba,
Venti and Wise 2007). In the UK, policy reforms emphasize individual, funded,
second pillar provision with some investment choice but with centralized col-
lection and administration (Department for Work and Pensions 2006b). Both
the US and the UK plans for private accounts also imply less dependence
on earnings-linked public annuities, and more on commercial income streams,
whether conventional annuities or phased withdrawals.
2.1 Features of the Australian basic pension
The current Age Pension for a single pensioner who owns their own home is
$525 per fortnight, or $13,653 p.a. (US $11,880). Many pensioners are entitled
to additional allowances for pharmaceuticals, utilities, telephone, rent assis-
tance and for living in remote areas. Consequently pension eligibility is highly
valued by retirees and their advisors: allowances alone mean that qualifying
for the pension makes a single retiree at least $343 p.a. better o⁄, before any
basic payment is made. Allowances are adjusted in line with the consumer
price index (CPI) once or twice a year, but do not rise in line with the general
level of earnings as the base single pension does. In the analysis below we study
9the case of a single home-owning pensioner whose annual bene￿t is rounded
to $14,000 to re￿ ect the basic payment and the most common allowances.
Some OECD countries have ￿rst-pillar pension schemes that are adjusted in
line with in￿ ation and others are linked to wages growth. Schemes linked
with wages growth ensure that pensioners maintain relativity with wage earn-
ers as productivity increases, whereas price-linked schemes shrink coverage
to smaller sections of the population as the economy grows. Consequently
by de-coupling productivity growth and pension obligations, governments can
gradually shrink the size of pension liabilities over time. Whitehouse (2007)
cites the example of the UK BSP which was indexed to prices rather than
wages in 1981. At the time of the change, the pension represented 23.7% of
average earnings, but two decades later was worth less than 16% of average
earnings. Re-linking to earnings is a major part of the recent UK reforms.
In Australia, the base single pension is recalculated every six months (March
and September) to keep up with changes in the CPI and also to ensure that it
does not fall below 25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE).
Pensioners thus hold an option on the general level of wages and prices in the
economy so that the relative as well as real value of payments is maintained.
The adjustment in the base pension is
Pt
Pt￿1
= max[(1 + ht);(1 + nt)] (1)
where h is the rate of increase in the CPI and n is the rate of increase in
MTAWE over the previous six months. This relative-income protection has
been very valuable over the past 15 years because earnings growth has ex-
ceeded in￿ ation in most years. Figure 1 below graphs annualized 6-monthly
paths for in￿ ation and MTAWE, since March 1989.
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The average annualized increase in the CPI over this period was 3.1% com-
pared with 4.5% for MTAWE and 4.9% for the maximum of both the CPI and
MTAWE.
Means-testing of the Age Pension creates other option-like features over the
wealth of the retired. The means tests begin to reduce the pension at ￿xed
levels of income and/or wealth and the pension declines linearly to zero as
income and/or wealth increases. Means test boundaries are reviewed in line
with changes in the CPI. Since the means tests may interact with each other,
the pensioner is entitled to the least payment from either test, or zero. The as-
sets test begins to reduce the pension when wealth (excluding the pensioner￿ s
home) reaches $161,500, reducing the pension payment by $39 dollars per
thousand increase in wealth, reaching zero at wealth of around $511,600. For
income receipts, pension payments begin to reduce when the individual re-
11ceives $128 per fortnight or $3,328 p.a., and reach zero when income is $1,455
per fortnight or $37,837 p.a.
This implicit option payo⁄s in a higher pension as wealth falls below the
means-test boundary, so an optimizing retiree will trade o⁄ the marginal ad-
vantages of pension eligibility against the costs of lower wealth/income. The
taper encourages higher rates of consumption early in retirement. For the
remaining analysis, however, we do not study the pension taper since the
majority of retirees receive the full pension.
The crucial point is that higher personal retirement savings will reduce the
public basic pension. Retirees with signi￿cant savings thus have less access
to this public annuity, and must go to the private sector for decumulation
services. As in many developed countries (James and Song 2001) voluntary
purchase of term annuities in Australia is very low, and voluntary purchase of
life annuities is even less. The majority of Australian retirees either take their
second pillar payouts as discretionary lump-sums, or as phased withdrawal
plans. Consequently, welfare depends on how e¢ ciently a retiree can replace
the pension payment with a phased withdrawal.
In the next section we outline a method for calculating the stochastic present
value of a pension-equivalent income stream when the payment is drawn from
a phased withdrawal product, as might be purchased with the proceeds of an
individual retirement savings account. Comparing the stochastic present value
of a phased withdrawal with the expected discounted value of the Age Pen-
sion gives the money￿ s worth of self-annuitization. We can also use stochastic
present value to estimate the individual savings needed to reproduce the basic
pension payments.
123 Stochastic present value of retirement wealth
To make a valuation in terms of phased withdrawal products (which have
both investment and longevity risk), we need a method that accounts for the
likelihood of failure or ruin under a self-annuitization scheme. 5
First consider the problem of a retiree who plans to consume one dollar each
year from an initial retirement wealth W0 = w: The retiree invests wealth in
a portfolio returning a continuously compounded risk-free rate of return, ￿:
Wealth invested this way has a dynamic path given by the ordinary di⁄erential
equation
dWt = (￿Wt ￿ 1)dt;W0 = w;Wt ￿ 0; (2)
which has a solution





























Thus a retiree invested in a risk-free portfolio knows if and when her wealth
will expire. For large enough combinations of investment return and initial
wealth (￿w ￿ 1) she will never reach zero wealth while consuming only one
dollar per year.
To model ruin when reforms are stochastic, we consider a portfolio of risky
5 In this section we follow Milevsky (2006, chapter 9 and appendix to chapter 9)
and Huang et. al (2004).
13assets following a geometric Brownian motion with known drift and di⁄usion,
dSt = ￿Stdt + ￿StdBt (5)
where Bt is a standard Wiener process. The solution to (5) is
St = e(￿￿1=2￿2)t+￿Bt;S0 = 1: (6)
If the retiree keeps consuming at a continuous rate of one dollar per year, the
wealth process is
dWt = dSt ￿ 1dt = (￿Wt ￿ 1)dt + ￿WtdBt;W0 = w; (7)




















;W0 = w: 6 (9)
The draw-down process (8) can become negative if the drift ￿Wt is small,
precipitating ruin.
We evaluate retirement consumption plans by determining the probability of





￿(w) ￿ Pr[ inf
0￿s￿T Ws ￿ 0jW0 = w]; (10)
6 For some intuition on
R t
0 S￿1
t dt; consider the discrete time analogue. A
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￿￿1
: We compare this present value with initial wealth to de-
termine the probability of net wealth reaching zero.
14or the likelihood that the lowest value of the stochastic process (8) goes to
zero before the retiree reaches the end of life at terminal date, T: 7
Since the portfolio return St is bounded away from zero, retirement wealth can






￿(￿￿1=2￿2)t￿￿Btdt ! w: (11)
As t increases, Zt increases monotonically, so if Wt does becomes negative, it
cannot recover (even very high returns cannot increase a zero wealth). As a
result, the probability of ruin before a pre-determined time T is




￿(￿￿1=2￿2)t￿￿Btdt] = 1 ￿ Pr[ZT < w]; (12)
or the likelihood that the stochastic present value of the spending plan exceeds
initial wealth.
If the time horizon is in￿nite, Huang et al. (2004) prove that the ruin prob-
ability has a closed form analytic solution. But here we look at the case of a
limited lifetime, T < 1; and more speci￿cally at the case of an uncertain and
￿nite length of life, where Tx < 1 is a random variable following a known
mortality law.
7 A person￿ s tolerance for the probability of ruin is related to risk preferences:
we could think of retirement utility as some general function where the level of
(constant real) consumption is a positive argument and the probability of ruin is
a negative argument. Further, Milevsky and Robinson (2005) propose that asking
a retiree a straightforward question about willingness to tolerate possible ruin may
be as good a guide to risk preferences as hypothetical surveys commonly used by
￿nancial advisors to assess risk tolerance.






￿(w)=1 ￿ Pr[ZTx < w]: (14)
However, since the density function of ZTx is unknown, we need an approxi-
mation method to compute the probability of ruin when the length of life is
uncertain.
Huang et al. (2004) outline an approximation based on a moment matching
approach. Using the law of iterated expectations, the ￿rst moment of the
random variable ZTx is



































where tpx is the conditional probability of an individual surviving t more years,
having reached age x:
Given an instantaneous force of mortality (hazard rate) ￿(t); the conditional









































The ￿rst moment integral in (15) thus evaluates to
M
(1)






















v e￿tt(u￿1)dt is the incomplete Gamma function. Similarly,



























Having identi￿ed the ￿rst two moments of the true but unknown density
function of ZTx, the issue is to what known density function can they be
approximated so that ruin probabilities can be evaluated analytically? The
limiting distribution for Z1 (T ! 1) is a reciprocal Gamma distribution,























M(2) ￿ M(1)M(1) ; ￿ =
M(2) ￿ M(1)M(1)
M(2)M(1) : (22)
Given this limiting result, Huang et al. (2004) propose approximating the dis-
tribution of ZTx using the moments derived above in equations (19) - (20);
substituted into (22); and numerically evaluated as a reciprocal Gamma ran-
dom variable.
17The value we are primarily interested in is the probability that the stochastic
present value of a consumption and investment plan exceeds initial wealth,
W0 = w; ￿(w) = 1￿Pr[ZTx < w] = Pr[ZTx > w]: Furthermore, the probability
that a reciprocal Gamma random variable is greater than a particular value
is equal to the probability that a Gamma random variable is less than the
inverse of that value, or,
￿(w) = Pr[ inf






where the right hand side is the probability that a random variable with
a Gamma distribution de￿ned by ￿ and ￿ is less than 1
w: (However since
we evaluate the Gamma distribution over a negative parameter, we need to
rescale using the method described in Appendix A.)
The basic pension is like a very safe phased withdrawal plan - one with a
ruin probability of less than, say, 1%. (There is always a small, but non-zero,
probability that regulators will remove or reduce the pension payment, so we
think of this regulatory risk as the probability that the pensioner reaches ruin
under public provision.) If we estimate the in￿ ation and earnings adjusted
drift and di⁄usion of the investment plan selected, and model the mortality
of a typical retiree, we can ￿x the probability of ruin at 1%, and infer the size
of initial wealth W0 = w using (23): We conclude that this required wealth
W0 = wj￿(w) = 0:01 is the stochastic present value of a phased withdrawal
from the selected investment strategy that substantially replicates the Age
Pension.
184 Parameter selection
Reproducing the Age Pension payment stream using the stochastic present
value method requires three parameters - the drift and di⁄usion terms for the
portfolio process ￿ and ￿, that is the return and volatility of the portfolio
selected by the retiree, and the instantaneous force of mortality, ￿; a function
of the Gompertz scale and mode parameters b and m.
4.1 Portfolio return and volatility
Consistent with our aim of establishing how much wealth a privately funded
retiree would need to generate a consumption stream equal to the Age Pen-
sion in value and certainty, we con￿ne ourselves to the portfolios typically
o⁄ered to Australian superannuants in the retirement incomes market. Most
phased withdrawal products amount to holding an account in one or more of
these investment portfolios with minimum draw-down rates ￿xed by regulation
(Bateman and Thorp 2007).
We label our ￿ve arti￿cial portfolios as High Growth, Growth, Balanced, Con-
servative and Capital Stable, where each is a combination of two or more asset
classes from Australian shares, international shares, Australian property se-
curities, Australian ￿xed interest and cash. We make no claim that these
constructed investments are optimal, since a wider variety of assets and pos-
sibly more e¢ cient weighting schemes are available. However a quick survey
of providers (such as Vanguard and Colonial First State) will show that our
choices are typical. Portfolio weights are set out in Table 1. The portfolios
decline in exposure to growth assets, from 90% allocation to shares and prop-
19erty in the High Growth fund, 70% in Growth, 50% in Balanced, 30% in





High Growth Growth Balanced Conservative Capital Stable
Australian Equities 50% 37% 26% 16% 0%
International Equities 30% 23% 17% 10% 0%
Property Securities 10% 10% 7% 4% 0%
Fixed Interest 10% 28% 28% 28% 30%
Cash 0% 2% 22% 42% 70%
To estimate real returns and volatility for each of these portfolios we collect
monthly time series of returns indices for each asset class over the 16-year
period, 30 December 1989 ￿30 June 2006. For each asset class, we compute
a monthly periodic return and apply portfolio weights (Table 1) to get a
portfolio return, so that (1 + iP;t) =
Pn
j=1 !j (1 + ij;t) where (1 + iP;t) is the
gross nominal monthly portfolio return over month t, !j is the proportion
allocated to asset class j and (1 + ij;t) is the nominal monthly gross return to
asset index j. To translate this to a real return, we derive a monthly percentage
change in the quarterly Consumer Price Index by linear interpolation ht (or
for MTAWE, nt) and compute the monthly log-change in the real portfolio
return as
rP;t = lnSt ￿ lnSt￿1 = ln(1 + iP;t) ￿ ln(1 + ht) (24)
8 The average Australian retiree chooses to hold a relatively high proportion of
growth assets in their portfolio - more than 50% in property and equities - according
to survey data (see Thorp et al. 2007).
20or if we de￿ ate by the greater of in￿ ation and earnings growth
rP;t = lnSt ￿ lnSt￿1 = ln(1 + iP;t) ￿ ln(max[(1 + ht);(1 + nt)]): (25)






























where T is the number of observations.
Table 2 shows the nominal and real returns and volatilities for each of the port-
folios. The average in￿ ation rate is 2.8% and the average earnings-augmented
de￿ ation is 4.4%. Historical returns are tempered by poor international equity
results in the later part of the sample, but, coming as they do out of 16 years
of economic expansion in Australia, and coinciding with strong domestic eq-
uity and property performance, may be overly optimistic as a proxy for future
returns.
We also deduct an indicative management fee from the real returns, such
as are charged by providers of phased withdrawal products o⁄ering similar
investments (see, for example, AMP (2007) for accounts of value 100-499K).
Management fees for retail investors in retirement income products are in
the range of 1-3% of account value, and are high by international standards,
although a wide variety of fee structures are on o⁄er. We note that such high
management expenses in the accumulation stage were a motivation for the UK
Government￿ s plan to centralize the collection and administration of individual
retirement savings accounts (Department for Work and Pensions 2006b).
21Table 2
Portfolio summary statistics
Nominal CPI-adj CPI/AWE adj
Return Return less fees Return less fees Std. Dev.
High Growth 10.4% 7.6% 5.7% 6.0% 4.1% 9.9%
Growth 10.0% 7.2% 5.4% 5.6% 3.8% 7.9%
Balanced 9.2% 6.4% 4.7% 4.8% 3.1% 5.8%
Conservative 8.5% 5.7% 4.0% 4.1% 2.4% 3.8%
Capital Stable 7.5% 4.7% 3.1% 3.1% 1.5% 1.5%
Note: Portfolio weights are in Table 1. Australian equities are the Australia-
DS Market index, International equities are the AC WORLD INDEX ex AUS-
TRALIA translated into Australian dollars at the end-month AUD/USD ex-
change rate, ￿xed income is the UBS Composite All Maturities index for Aus-
tralia, property is the S&P/ASX 300 Property index and cash is the UBS AU
Bank Bills All Maturities index, all from Datastream. The total return price in-
dex (RI) of the relevant asset class index is used for calculations of the periodic
monthly returns. As a measure of in￿ ation (earnings), we use a linear interpo-
lation of quarterly annualized growth in the CPI (MTAWE), translated into a
monthly log change. The CPI data are from the Reserve Bank of Australia data-
base and MTAWE is from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Publication 6302.0.
Indicative management fees are taken from the AMP Allocated Pension Product
Disclosure Statement (AMP 2007) for managed fund investments of similar risk
exposure and account size $100-$499k.
4.2 Force of mortality
Over the past hundred years, mortality rates in Australia have been declining
rapidly. By the publication of the most recent (2000-2002) Life Tables (Com-
monwealth of Australia 2004), mortality rates were 40-45% lower than in the
22mid-1960s. Improved life expectancy implies longer retirements and raises the
value of a guaranteed income stream such as the Age Pension. Even so, uncer-
tainty over the length of life is a crucial factor in life-cycle planning and one
of the advantages of the stochastic present value model is that it incorporates
this risk via approximations to the survival density.
4.2.1 Gompertz force of mortality






1 ￿ exp 1
b
￿
; taking discrete mortality data, px; from the Australian
Life Tables 2000-2002. The conditional survival probability px we use in es-
timation is adjusted by the 25 year improvement factors as described in the
Life Tables. Model ￿t worsens if the sample includes the thin mortality data
at extreme old age, so the sample runs from ages 50 to 90. Table 3 reports
estimation results for males and females.
23Table 3
Estimated Gompertz parameters.
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^ m ^ b
Coe¢ cient 90.70 7.60
p-value (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.999
Note: Estimated coe¢ cients and ￿t statistics for the non-linear least-squares es-
timation of the Gompertz equation, where px; is the improved probability of
surviving one more year having reached age x; and b and m are the scale and
mode parameters of the distribution. Data are the discrete survival probabilities
for males (females) aged 50 to 90 years from the 2000-2002 Australian Life Tables,
improved by the 25-year improvement factors.
Having estimated a range of parameter values to re￿ ect investment choices
and current mortality for Australians eligible for the Age Pension we can input
these to equation (23) and infer a probability of retirement ruin. Alternatively
we can ￿x the likelihood of ruin, the drift and di⁄usion, and infer the initial
wealth needed to fund a payment scheme. This is the amount of private savings
a worker needs to accumulate to safely guarantee that income stream.
245 Valuing the basic pension
The most obvious way to value the basic pension is as a standard annuity.
We begin with this computation and then use the method of Section 3 to
revalue the pension using the stochastic present value of some typical com-
mercial decumulation plans. Finally we compute the money￿ s worth of phased
withdrawals and show e⁄ects on welfare of delaying retirement and of varying
management fees.
5.1 Annuity value of the Age Pension
The Age Pension payment is an indexed immediate life annuity. Vx(A) is the






(1 + ￿ r)t (26)
where A is the pension payment, here assumed to be $14000 p.a., ￿ r is the
real rate of interest on long duration government debt, t￿ px is the (discrete)
probability that an individual of age x survives another t years, and T is the
oldest old age in the Life Tables. For simplicity and for consistency with the
return estimates set out in Section 4, we assume a ￿ at term structure, and set
￿ r as the geometric mean of the annualized monthly yield on a 5 year Treasury
Bond (Reserve Bank of Australia series) divided by either the geometric mean
in￿ ation or the geometric mean of the maximum of the increase in the CPI or
MTAWE, over the sample 30 December 1989 ￿30 June 2006. We compute t￿ px
using the improved probabilities for males/females from the 2002 Australian
Life Tables. Table 4 sets out these annuity values by gender and age.
25Table 4
Expected discounted value of the basic Age Pension by age and gender (an-
nuity factor in italics).
Age CPI Indexed CPI/MTAWE Indexed
F M F M
65 $197908 $178240 $236870 $209825
14.136 12.731 16.919 14.987
70 $172373 $143571 $201365 $165142
12.312 10.255 14.383 11.796
75 $144881 $112938 $165247 $127076
10.349 8.067 11.803 9.077
80 $116337 $82796 $129708 $91317
8.310 5.914 9.265 6.523
We use these valuations to calculate the money￿ s worth of a commercial an-
nuity or phased withdrawal.
5.2 Risk of ruin
The stochastic present value model can be used to predict the sustainability of
a self-funded retiree￿ s investment and spending plan without using simulation
experiments. For example, Table 5 shows the probability that an individual
with a ￿xed consumption plan will run out of money before the end of life. In
this example our investor reaches age 65 and retires with a net $1,000,000 and
then decides on a ￿xed real spending plan of between $20,000 and $100,000
each year. The lowest retirement ruin probabilities for each draw-down rate is
marked with an asterisk. Which is the least-risk investment strategy depends
on required levels of drawdown: for 4-6% of initial retirement wealth, the
growth portfolio is least likely to be exhausted, whereas at higher expenditure
26(8% of initial wealth) the high growth portfolio is safer. 9
Table 5
Probability of retirement ruin for female (male) age 65, initial wealth $1 mil-
lion.
Probability of retirement ruin (%), w = $1 million
Real spending rate, $000 p.a.
20 40 60 80 100
F M F M F M F M F M
High Growth 0.03 0.04 2.6 2.1 18.6 13.3 47.4￿ 34.8 73.7￿ 58.6￿
Growth 0.008 0.02 1.8￿ 1.6￿ 17.0￿ 12.1￿ 48.2 34.6￿ 76.4 59.9
Balanced 0.004￿ 0.01￿ 1.8 1.7 19.5 13.6 54.9 38.7 83.0 65.4
Conservative 0.004 0.02 2.2 2.1 24.0 16.3 63.1 44.3 88.7 71.4
Capital Stable 0.01 0.03 3.9 3.3 33.6 22.1 74.0 53.1 93.9 78.7
If preferences are measurable in terms of ruin probability, then a retiree could
use this table to decide on an investment and spending plan by trading o⁄an
increase in ruin probability against an increase in spending. However we note
that in some respects the stochastic present value method is at odds with con-
ventional utility theory. A constant real level of consumption is not an optimal
strategy for, say, a power utility maximizer - the best plan is a constant rate of
draw-down (leaving aside survival uncertainty). As Brown (2000) points out,
a constant level of consumption implies in￿nite risk aversion for an individ-
ual with power utility preferences over consumption, manifesting in complete
unwillingness to transfer consumption across time. And further, the utility
maximizing consumer with conventional preferences will never allow wealth
to fall to zero because at zero wealth the marginal utility of consumption is
in￿nite.
9 The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) estimate that a
single, home-owning retiree in 2006 needed around $18,200 p.a. for a modest lifestyle
and $35,400 p.a. to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.
27While theoretically sub-optimal for conventional preferences, a constant real
consumption stream is exactly what is o⁄ered under the Age Pension and
similar basic pension schemes around the world, so the stochastic present
value method is a reasonable valuation approach.
5.3 Wealth value of the Age Pension
Given the Australian Government￿ s historical support for the program, we
could argue that the likelihood of running out of money when receiving the Age
Pension approaches zero, but in the analysis below we accept some regulation
risk. In other words we assume that the Age Pensioner still faces a very small
but non-zero, probability of ruin.
How much retirement wealth would an individual self-funded retiree need to
generate a constant real income of $14,000 p.a. and what would be the least-
risk approach to creating that income stream? Table 6 sets out the amount
of initial wealth needed to support the pension payment for men and women
of average improved mortality who invest in standard managed funds. We
compute this wealth amount for age 65 and report it as a multiple of average
annual earnings. In February 2007, full-time adult ordinary time earnings were
$1,072 per week or $55,728 p.a. seasonally adjusted (ABS release 6302.0).
28Table 6
Wealth required at age 65 to produce in￿ ation adjusted $14,000 p.a. real in-
come.
Initial wealth premium for $14000 income as multiple of average earnings
Female 65 yrs Male 65 yrs
Portfolio Ruin probability Ruin probability
0.5% 1% 3% 5% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
High Growth 8.24 7.39 6.13 5.41 8.19 7.24 5.86 5.27
Growth 7.54 6.84 5.79￿ 5.31￿ 7.63 6.80￿ 5.60￿ 5.07￿
Balanced 7.43￿ 6.79￿ 5.82 5.38 7.62￿ 6.84 5.68 5.16
Conservative 7.59 6.97 6.01 5.41 7.85 7.06 5.88 5.36
Capital Stable 8.24 7.56 6.52 6.04 8.54 7.67 6.38 5.80
CPI Indexed life annuity 6.06 5.90
The required wealth level at retirement for a 65 year-old female ranges from
as much as 8.24 times average annual earnings for very high or low risk invest-
ment portfolios at 0.5% probability of failure, to 5.31 times earnings for the
growth portfolio with a 5% probability of failure. At our benchmark 1% fail-
ure probability, the most e¢ cient investment allocation is to a balanced fund,
needing 6.79 times average earnings or accumulated wealth of $378,581. This
amount is 8.6 times more than current average superannuation balances for
females 60-65 years (approximately $44,000: ASFA 2007). More conservative
and more risky investment strategies need more savings to generate the real
income stream with the desired level of security. By contrast, commercial in-
surance ￿rms currently o⁄er CPI-indexed single life annuities paying $14,000
p.a. at a premium of $337,455, or 6.06 times average annual earnings. 10
For males, wealth requirements are similar to females at the 1% probability
of failure. The slightly riskier growth portfolios, with 70% exposure to equity
10 Average purchase price to generate $14000 p.a. using CPI indexed single life
annuities without gurantee for 65 year old male and female, Table F, DeXX&R
Retirement Incomes League Tables, Quarterly Statistics ending December 2006.
29and property assets, are most e¢ cient for generating the real income stream.
A 65 year old male needs 6.8 times average earnings ($379,194) a sum about
three times as large as estimates of the current average male accumulation of
approximately $130,000 (ASFA 2007). The cost of a single-life, CPI-indexed
annuity for a 65 year old male is $328,844 or 5.9 times average earnings, which
again is less costly than the phased withdrawals.
As discussed in Section 2, Age Pension payments are adjusted to be no less
than 25% of MTAWE. In Table 7 we value this connection with earnings
growth by computing the wealth needed at retirement to generate an income
stream that maintains real value and parity with earnings. We do this by
￿ de￿ ating￿nominal returns by the maximum of monthly changes in prices and
earnings over the sample. Since earnings have outpaced in￿ ation historically,
larger accumulations are needed to match the growth in wages.
Table 7
Wealth required at age 65 to produce the earnings and in￿ ation adjusted
equivalent to $14000 p.a.
Initial wealth premium for $14000 income as multiple of average earnings
Female 65 yrs Male 65 yrs
Portfolio Ruin probability Ruin probability
0.5% 1% 3% 5% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
High Growth 10.48 9.30 7.57 6.82 10.26 8.96 6.64 6.34
Growth 9.60 8.62 7.16￿ 6.52￿ 9.57 8.44￿ 6.82￿ 6.12￿
Balanced 9.46￿ 8.55￿ 7.20 6.59 9.55￿ 8.47 6.90 6.22
Conservative 9.74 8.84 7.49 6.88 9.91 8.81 7.21 6.51
Capital Stable 10.83 9.82 8.30 7.62 11.02 9.77 7.95 7.17
5% indexed life annuity 7.56 6.61
At our benchmark 1% probability of failure, a 65 year old female needs 8.55
times average annual earnings ($476,694) in retirement savings to generate the
earnings- and in￿ ation-adjusted pension payment. This wealth is 26% more
30than required wealth if the pension tracks in￿ ation only, and we conclude
that the link to earnings is very valuable to pensioners. Males require 8.44
times average earnings at age 65, a 24% increase over the amount needed to
match in￿ ation increases only. The closest commercial single life annuity to
the earnings-linked Age Pension payment is a single life indexed to rise at 5%
p.a. A 65 year old female would pay $421,559 or 7.56 times average earnings for
a 5% indexed annuity paying $14,000 in the ￿rst year, whereas the premium
for a male is currently $368,227, or 6.6 times average annual earnings, again
below the cost of self-insurance via phased withdrawals.
5.4 Money￿ s worth
If we choose the least-cost investment strategy and allow the time of retirement
to vary, we can compare the money￿ s worth of phased withdrawal plans over
a range of ages. The money￿ s worth is the ratio of the expected net present
value of the annuity stream to the purchase price (Mitchell et al. 1999), or in
our case, the ratio of the expected net present value of the pension payment to
required initial wealth of the phased withdrawal, allowing for very improbable
plan failure.
Studies of the money￿ s worth of immediate nominal single life annuities across
a range of countries ￿nd that commercial o⁄erings represent reasonable value
for consumers (James and Song 2001). For the US and Australia, Mitchell and
McCarthy (2002) report money￿ s worth ratios above 0.8 and 0.9 respectively.
Similarly, Cannon and Tonks (2004) put the money￿ s worth of UK annuities
above 0.9. Compared with these, the value of the phased withdrawals we report
here is very low.
31In Figure 2 below, we graph the money￿ s worth of the least-cost phased with-
drawal as the age and gender of the pensioner varies. For women this is either
the balanced or growth portfolio, and for men, the growth portfolio. Expected
discounted values of the pension stream at each age are from Table 4 above.
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The money￿ s worth of the phased withdrawal strategy decreases with increas-
ing age, and is higher for females than for males. Most phased withdrawals
o⁄er a money￿ s worth ratio below 0.5. The highest ratio is 0.52 for a 65 year old
female matching an in￿ ation-indexed payment, and the lowest is 0.29 for an
80-year-old male matching a CPI/AWE indexed payment. By comparison, the
money￿ s worth of the commercial immediate life annuities for CPI/CPI-AWE
indexing are 0.54/0.57 for males, and 0.59/0.56 for females.
32Management fees are a major component of the cost of these self-insurance
strategies. Figure 3 graphs the impact of varying management fees from 0-
2% p.a. in the best phased withdrawal strategy for 65 year old males and
females. The money￿ s worth of each strategy declines linearly as fees increase:
the ratio for females falls by 0.15 as fees increase from 0-2%, and the ratio for
males falls less steeply by 0.12. The impact on wealth required at retirement is
substantial. For the CPI-AWE indexed plans the di⁄erence in wealth between
zero and two per cent fees for females is $126,867 and for males is $112,048. In
other words, for each 1% increase in fees, a retiree needs an additional $60,000
in wealth, or more than one year￿ s earnings.
Figure 3
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336 Conclusion
The majority of elderly Australians rely on a targeted public pension, the
Age Pension, as their main source of retirement income. Despite the maturing
of the mandatory, earnings-linked personal savings scheme (Superannuation
Guarantee), individual retirement accumulations are modest and likely to re-
main so in coming decades. General dependence by the elderly on transfers
from public revenue is forecast to continue. However, Australian Government
policy aims to alleviate increasing demands on public funds by encouraging
more reliance on private retirement savings rather than the basic pension.
Here we ask how much private savings would an individual have to accumu-
late to reproduce the payments and insurance features of the basic public
pension using commercial annuities or phased withdrawals? We compute the
retirement wealth that would allow a retiree to enjoy the same bene￿ts as the
basic pension using the standard draw-down products of the Australian re-
tirement incomes market. This amount represents the stochastic present value
at retirement of the Age Pension payment stream.
Since the exact density function of the stochastic present value of any re-
tirement spending plan is not known when lifetimes are uncertain, we use
a moment-matching approximation (Milevsky and Robinson 2000, 2005 and
Huang et al. 2004) to value a spending plan equivalent to the pension. Allow-
ing for a very low probability of reaching ￿ ruin￿ , we back out the initial nest
egg needed to replicate a $14,000 pension while accounting for investment and
longevity risk. We interpret this initial wealth as the value that a self-insured
retiree would attach to full pension eligibility.
34We estimate that the implicit public transfer to Age Pensioners is substantial,
in the order of $450,000 at age 65 or 8.5 times current average annual earnings.
This amount is many times larger than current average personal retirement
accumulations. The implicit transfer is generally larger for women because
of longer life expectancy, and harder for women to attain by private savings
because earnings-related accumulations are commonly smaller than for men.
Delaying retirement by ￿ve years reduces required wealth by only 5% or less.
On the other hand, 25% more wealth is needed to maintain the relative level
of the pension with wages, as compared with indexing to consumer prices,
and around 6% more wealth is needed for each 1% increase in investment
management fees.
The money￿ s worth ratio of phased withdrawal products is very low, generally
less than 0.5, so we conclude that switching from public to private provision
is expensive, with substantial extra wealth needed to cover management and
administrative fees, as well as the costs of self-insuring against investment and
longevity risk. On the other hand low levels of voluntary annuitization suggest
that retirees are willing to bear risks and costs in exchange for continued
ownership of their lump sum, and we have not explicitly valued this feature
of phased withdrawals. Finally, despite their marked unpopularity with the
retired, commercial life annuity products mimic public pension payment paths
more cheaply than drawn-down plans invested in managed funds.
Dramatic increases in retirement savings are needed if lower levels of basic
pension reliance are to be realized in Australia. The likelihood of the majority
of employees accumulating su¢ cient in second pillar savings to generate a
basic pension equivalent payment seems remote. On the other hand, the high
implicit value of pension eligibility creates incentives for retirees to draw down
35private savings faster in order to access pension bene￿ts.
Appendix A: Rescaling the incomplete gamma function
A numerical complication arises from the fact that the incomplete gamma
function which appears in the moments (19) and (20) is di¢ cult to compute
in most software packages because ￿1 < ￿￿b < 0 and the packages will not
return gamma values de￿ned over negative parameters. A rescaling derived
from Milevsky (2001) allows the incomplete gamma function to be rewritten
over (￿￿b + 1) > 0:





where x;a > 0; and the cumulative density function is given by:
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: The negative value ￿￿b rules out using
standard software to retrieve these values. Milevsky (2001) suggests rede￿ning
the incomplete gamma function over ￿￿b+1; which will be non-negative, and
then rescaling to get back to the original problem.
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Equation (33) is easily programmed into standard spreadsheet packages. For
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